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Tag: What is comparative Constitution

what is comparative constitutional law

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What is comparative constitutional law? Comparative law is amethod of legal study comparing legal systems with each other. As the world has become smaller through the effects of globalization, scholarship in comparative law has also expanded.Author:Margaret ClarkPublish Year:2014

How does constitutional law compare with common law?

The constitutional law of a country can be changed if the government falls or changes. Additions can also be made to the constitution in form of amendments. In short, common law are the laws that are developed based on old court decisions, while constitution laws are laws that were established when the constitution of the land was written.

What is the importance of Comparative Law?

Purposes of comparative lawHistorical and cultural comparisons. First of all,there has been a tendency to view comparative law from the standpoint of its value to the historical study of legal decision making—a …Commercial uses. Comparative law may be used for essentially practical ends. …Aid to national law. …Use in international law. …

What are the principles of constitutional law?

Constitutional law is a body of law based on a ratified constitution or similar formative charter dealing with the fundamental principles by which a government exercises its authority. These principles typically define the roles and powers of the various branches of the government and the basic rights of the people.

What is comparative Constitution?

Comparative constitutional law is an intellectually vibrant field that encompasses an increasingly broad array of approaches and methodologies. This series collects analytically innovative and empirically grounded work from scholars of comparative constitutionalism across academic disciplines.

What is a WG5?

The SINTELNET WG5 Workshop on Crowd Intelligence was held in Barcelona on 8-9 January 2014. The European Network for Social Intelligence (SINTELNET) regularly organizes Interdisciplinary Workshops to explore and discuss the interplay of humanities, philosophy, social science and information technologies around key social intelligence notions. The goal of this WG5 Workshop was to provide an open forum for discussion on the theoretical foundations, methods and tools, and practices of crowd intelligence. The workshop paid attention to the interplay between humans and computers in different domains and discussed the complexities linked to coordinating crowds. Participants also engaged in conversations on appropriate methods, lessons drawn from case studies, and identified areas for further research. The Workshop brought together twelve participants mainly from universities and research centers in Catalonia, UK, Ireland, Germany, and Morocco. The workshop received 12 original submissions, covering a number of different domains within the crowd intelligence topic (theoretical foundations, education, prediction markets, arbitration, constitution making, and disaster management). All submitted versions were reviewed by at least two members of the Program Committee. These proceedings finally include ten of these papers.

What are comparative constitutional sources?

The writing and rewriting of constitutions are often inspired or influenced by comparative constitutional sources. The Republic of China (ROC) Constitution has been deemed as strongly influenced by comparative constitutional sources such as the US Federal Constitution, the Constitution of the Empire of Japan (Meiji Constitution), and the Reich Constitution of 11 August 1919 (Weimar Constitution). However, in what ways these foreign constitutional sources have exerted influences upon the domestic discourse of constitutional writing remains unclear. This chapter is aimed at understanding such comparative constitutional influences by closely examining the discourse of constitution drafting and making of the ROC Constitution, which became effective in 1947 and has since been implemented in Taiwan. Having relied on empirical and statistic methods, this chapter finds that comparative constitutional discourse was vital in the drafting and making of the ROC Constitution, and more importantly, the studying abroad experiences of constitutional drafters may have been pivotal to their engagement in the comparative constitutional discourse. Inspired by the comparative discourse in constitution making, subsequent constitutional interpretations by Taiwan’s Constitutional Court have engaged abundantly in comparative discourse, notwithstanding the fact that the Constitutional Court has not indicated precise sources of those foreign influences. Leading constitutional scholars, however, have not been shy away from the acknowledgment of those inspiring foreign sources.

How do constitutional drafters defer decisions?

In designing constitutions, constitutional drafters often face constraints that cause them to leave things “undecided”—or to defer decision-making on certain constitutional issues to the future. They do this both through adopting vague constitutional language, and through specific language that explicitly delegates issues to future legislators (i.e. “by law” clauses). The aim of this article is to deepen our understanding of this second, to date largely un-examined, tool of constitutional design. We do so by exploring: (1) the rationale for constitutional deferral generally; (2) the potential alternatives to “by law” clauses as a means of addressing concerns about constitutional “error” and “decision” costs: (3) the disadvantages, as well as advantages, to such clauses: (4) the likely and actual prevalence of such mechanisms in national constitutions; and (5) the optimal use of such clauses. The paper draws on both the empirical dataset created by the Comparative Constitutions Project and case material from Australia, Brazil, Iraq, Kenya, South Africa, Taiwan, and the U.S. involving instances of arguably “successful” and “unsuccessful” constitutional deferral.

What are the roles of courts in democratization?

These include, very rarely, serving as a trigger for democratization , and more commonly, serving as downstream guarantor for departing autocrats or as downstream consolidator of democracy. In light of these roles, this essay reviews six relatively recent books: Courts in Latin America, edited by Helmke and Rios-Figueroa (2011); Judges Beyond Politics in Democracy and Dictatorship: Lessons from Chile, by Hilbink (2007); Cultures of Legality: Judicialization and Political Activism in Latin America, edited by Couso, Huneeus and Sieder (2011); The Legacies of Law: Long-Run Consequences of Legal Development in South Africa, 1652-2000, by Meierhenrich (2008); Judging Russia: Constitutional Court in Russian Politics 1990-2006, by Trochev (2008); and New Courts in Asia, edited by Harding and Nicholson (2010).

What is the appropriate level of deference to the President?

A recurring debate in foreign affairs law focuses on the appropriate level of congressional and judicial deference to the President. In answering that question, most scholars focus on the Constitution, Supreme Court precedent, and historical practice for guidance, or evaluate the expertise and strategic incentives of Congress, the President, and the courts. For them, the inquiry exclusively centers on domestic, internal constraints on the President. But this analysis is incomplete. Determination of the appropriate level of deference has consequences for how the President can pursue American interests abroad. If the U.S. wants to be successful in achieving its foreign policy goals, it requires some consideration of the external world in which the President acts. This Article challenges the conventional wisdom by arguing that the appropriate level of constraint on the President requires an evaluation of both internal constraints from domestic sources and external constraints from international politics. It provides a framework to integrate both sets of constraints, develops a theory of external constraints, and describes the normative implications of this approach for foreign affairs law. The Article argues that the failure to account for both internal and external constraints and to recognize their relationship might yield a deference regime that either does not provide the President with sufficient freedom to pursue U.S. interests (over-constrained), or leaves the President free to act without sufficient congressional and judicial oversight (under-constrained). It further explains the conditions under which higher and lower levels of constraints are preferable and moves us closer to determining the appropriate level of deference to the President in foreign affairs.

What is the criticism of international delegations?

The criticism begins by drawing a stark contrast between international delegations and domestic delegations. For domestic delegations to agencies, U.S. congressional, executive and judicial oversight mechanisms are present to try and maintain the agency’s democratic accountability. Since the agency is democratically accountable, the agency costs are low. For international delegations of binding authority to international institutions, however, the conventional wisdom is that oversight mechanisms are absent and the U.S. cannot monitor the international institution to ensure it acts within its delegated authority. In the international context, agency costs are high. The fear of high agency costs through the loss of democratic accountability, so the argument goes, justifies constitutionally inspired limits on international delegations. This Article challenges the conventional wisdom. It argues that the agency costs claim rests on weak foundations as agency costs will likely vary depending on the type, scope, and nature of the delegation; that the U.S. has actually implemented many of the domestic oversight tools in the international context, ensuring a surprisingly high level of accountability to American interests; and that the potential costs and benefits of international delegations are not meaningfully different from those in domestic delegations. In other words, there is little systematic difference between domestic and international delegations with respect to the efficacy of oversight mechanisms or the balance of costs and benefits. The Article concludes that constitutionally inspired limits on binding international delegations are probably unnecessary because they will increase the costs for the U.S. to participate in potentially beneficial international cooperation.

What is institution matching canon?

It can be stated briefly as follows: When the government makes a decision that may impinge upon a liberty or equality interest — which may or may not be directly judicially enforced otherwise — a court should determine whether the component of government that made the decision has actual competence in and responsibility for the policy justifications invoked to curtail the interest. If not, the court should reject the government action but leave open the possibility of a “do-over” by a more appropriate component of government. First identified in an early written opinion of Justice John Paul Stevens, the institution matching canon continues to play an important if imperfectly articulated role in criminal law, administrative law, and national security doctrine. This Article provides a systematic survey of the ways that the Court has employed institution matching and develops a taxonomy of the canon’s costs and benefits.

What do you mean by comparative law?

Comparative law is the study of differences and similarities between the law (legal systems) of different countries.

What is comparative Constitution?

Comparative constitutional law is an intellectually vibrant field that encompasses an increasingly broad array of approaches and methodologies. This series collects analytically innovative and empirically grounded work from scholars of comparative constitutionalism across academic disciplines.

What is a procedural rule?

An example for procedural rule is rule that prescribes a timetable for affirming substantive rights of parties. Procedural rules have no binding effect on parties. [ii] Procedural rules can be substantial in nature when an alteration in a procedural rule has a substantial effect on party’s rights and duties.

What is law PDF?

Law is an instrument which regulates human conduct/behavior. … Law means Statutes, Acts, Rules, Regulations, Orders, and Ordinances from point of view of legislature. Law means Rules of court, Decrees, Judgment, Orders of courts, and Injunctions from the point of view of Judges.

What are examples of procedural law?

As an example of procedural law, one can view the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP” (at the U.S. Court website.

What is difference between substantive law and procedural law?

Substantive law refers to how facts of each case are handled and how to penalize or ascertain damages in each case. Whereas, Procedural law refers to the different processes through which a case proceeds. Substantive laws define the legal relationship between different individuals, or between individuals and the State.